What's new
  • Visit Rebornbuddy
  • Visit Panda Profiles
  • Visit LLamamMagic
  • Visit Resources
  • Visit Downloads
  • Visit Portal

the Turing test

Status
Not open for further replies.
The transition from animal to human is almost universally considered to be motored at least partially by language.
Origin of language - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Evolution of Language Takes Unexpected Turn - Wired Science
Neurobiological origins of language - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I will briefly speak of 3 authors, one we have already met
The Language Instinct - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
one whose view is apparently different from the first
The Symbolic Species - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
and the last one who tries to integrate many views in a new one: Fitch, W. Tecumseh (2010). The Evolution of Language (see first link).
They share, despite their differences, three very fundamental conceptions:
1) the brain as a kind of computer,
2) evolution as a general model,
3) language as a prominent, if not "sole mover", in the evolution to Man. The fact that one prefers an immediate transition while the other advocate a more gradual passage is something that recurs frequently in debates between evolutionists.
I have, I think said enough about the first theme, and I mus admit that I have a strong intellectual bias, not against the idea of evolution, for which there is i think, no alternative, but against the way it is used as a quasi-magical explanation. It seems to me that every time an author wants to prove something, he just needs to make his idea plausible, and leave the rest to evolution.
Still, as I said, I am rather prejudiced, so It would not be fair from my part to review these authors.
But, let me say this: each times they seem to discover a transition from one evolutionary phase to the other, there seems to be always sensations/emotions involved. The trouble is that these sensations/emotions never get any explicit role, drowned as they are in the evolutionist jargon.
Another element that often returns in the argumentations, is the need to transcend the here and now (of stimuli).
Both points play a central role in my model, or rather, sketch of a model.
I propose now to look more closely at the role that language could play in this model. After all, what would be its use if it did not offer any new insights?

p.s: A very simple way of reading, in a critical way, evolutionist essays is to imagine evolution theory as wrong. You do not need to espouse the creationist alternative - I certainly do not- just suspend your judgment. You will see all the gaps in the argumentation that are supposed to be covered with the evolutionary blanket. Once you are done, you are free to believe what you want, as you always were. And if evolution theory is your thing, then who am I to complain?
This tip is of course usable with any theory. Including mine. Wittgenstein, ended his Traktatus by advising the reader to use it as a ladder, and throw it away once finished.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
I have talked earlier of the relationship between the choreography of a dance, and the dance itself. Let me add an analogy(edit: more of a riddle really) to my repertoire:
What is the relationship between linguistics and language? Let me help you on the way. It is something that nobody speaks.
When researchers think of the role of language, they think of it as a linguistic object, with its own rules for sound (phonetics), meaning (semantics), and sentence structure (syntax). So when they ask themselves what role language played in evolution, these are the things that come to their minds, even when they are studying concrete samples of language behavior.
The question then becomes very naturally: how did these rules evolve? Forgetting that these rules are the product of a theoretical approach to language.
It would be like musicians studying bird songs, and trying to deduce the structure of the neural networks that produced those very (generic) songs, with those very (generic) qualities.
I propose to view language not as the linguists do, but as it appears in nature: a behavior. Language is a set of actions involving different muscles and producing different effects. Language is like any other action undertaken by any living organism. By doing this, I free the analysis from foreign theoretical burdens that do not belong in the study of the evolution of Man and his brain. This way I can rephrase the question of the role of language in evolution as the neural prerequisites for such an action system, relative to previous action systems. I am not limited to different forms of language (songs, signs, vocal, written), but can consider any action system used by humans and non-humans alike.
This would look like a behaviorist approach that makes abstraction of any internal dimension to focus solely on the external behavior. My analysis until now should show that it is not my intention.
I consider the intentional stance certainly not as the trick Dennett takes it to be. Intentional stance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
We cannot understand humans, nor animals, without referring to sensations and emotions that are known to us at least indirectly. But we do not need a linguist's point of view, nor a musician's, nor a gymnastic teacher's. In fact, they can only obscure the issue.
 
I read the story of Kanzi of which i had only vaguely heard, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, and I must say I found quite a few similarities between their approach and mine, but also differences. A few quotations:
We recently warned about the danger in ape language research of confusing language with what might perhaps just be tempting ways
of conceiving language intellectually
When we observe how similar the dimensions are in Kanzi?s way of acquiring language and in human children?s first-language acquisition,
it seems less far-fetched that an ape can develop language.
why have they not developed it in the wild?? An important part of the answer is: just as evolution is not driven by an aim of developing Homo sapiens, so cultural changes are not driven by an aim of developing our human form of language, as if this form of language were some kind of ultimate state towards which all conscious creatures strive.
.
However, in a young bonobo finding himself in a cultural environment where human companions speak and gesture to him while doing exciting things together, there arises a profound drive to develop more humanlike language.
.

Especially the last quote shows the importance of feelings (motivation) in the use of cognitive abilities. Still, the problem remains, aptly worded by Fitch:
Kanzi cannot communicate all the concepts he can entertain. For example, Kanzi can successfully carry out quite complex motor actions, such as starting fires and making and using simple stone tools (Toth et al., 1993), but his ?linguistic? productions never even come close to the complexity required to describe these abilities.

This is also in compliance with my analysis: adding to the actions array does not change the limits of cognition.

So, comparing Kanzi to Amy, we can state that:
- Kanzi's sensation/emotion array seems to be large enough to accommodate much wider cognitive abilities. Apes are capable of love/caring, jealousy, deception, curiosity, playfulness, fear, joy... Whereas we have endowed Amy with no more than hunger until now.
- Both action arrays seem to be more or less similar. There is no reason for any differences except those based on body shapes.

All that rests are:
1) the connections between sensations/feelings and actions
It would seem that Kanzi's repertoire of actions is limited to very few patterns:
- beg
- play,
- fight,
- flee,
- imitate,
- ...
- innate or learned sequences, like grooming, hunting, or making a simple tool.
The question Fitch asks is very legitimate. Kanzi's vocabulary should be at least as wide as his actions repertoire.

2) Kanzi's sensations/feelings seem also to be limited by these very actions:
desire for
- food, (hunger)
- comfort, (fear)
- distraction (joy, curiosity)
These basic emotions are accompanied by more sophisticated ones like jealousy, deception, but they are all determined by the status quo: their world as it is.
This really should not surprise us. After all, humans are also capable of living the same routines for thousands of year without any significant change. But if you pluck someone from deep in the Amazonian jungle and drop him in a modern metropolis -the equivalent of a travel in time of 10000 years!-, he will eventually learn how to cope, if not thrive.
In my model, that means that humans have flexible connections between the different arrays their brain is made of, whereas animals are limited by direct connections.
We discovered, with the Amys, that they had only three fundamental arrays:
- sensations/emotions and their copy,
- external stimuli and their copy,
- actions and their copy.
Every direct link between one element of an array and the others, will limit the number of possibilities. This is different from the distinction in statistics between permutations and combinations. Only combinations (1 of each array in any order) are meaningful in this context.
Kanzi's behavior does not seem to answer this description. After all, he is capable of using fridges, can openers, gates etc. All modern objects that have no equivalents in his natural habitat. But they are all objects that can be manipulated with the same action repertoire he already possesses.

Language means applying the action array to any other array. Also, it can only originate, in my model, in the sensation array.
Instead of, to keep it simple
stimulus---> action
we have
virtual stimulus--->virtual action--->real action (gesture or speech).
There is no reason for the real action not to be possible, unless all Kanzi is experiencing is:
real stimulus--->real action.
That would mean that Kanzi is able to imitate making fire, but unable to imagine himself making fire on his own. Making fire does not belong to the standard, virtual, repertoire, even if it is a concrete possibility.
The making of stone tools is a little more complex, at first glance. But the fact that the tools are discarded after use, would also indicate that it is something that can be learned, but only as a concrete action, and not as an abstract pattern, which would necessitate a virtual copy.

edit: "Me Jane, you Tarzan" is grammatically correct in many languages. Native speakers of those languages who learn a second language like English can get very confused by, in their eyes, or ears, redundant "am" and "are", whereas their children have no difficulty using both grammars appropriately. In the case of humans, it is more a matter of lack of flexibility in the face of new patterns, For apes, it looks like a congenital impediment.
 
Did I solve the original problem I had posed? Why are humans smarter than animals?
First let me state that, when expressed in general terms, my model does not represent a shocking revolution. It says no more than that: animals are incapable of learning some things like language, because their neural apparatus does not permit it. Understood this way, it is pitifully trivial. That is what everybody says, whatever their convictions.
It is the reasons given that make such a general assertion worth anything. Let me recapitulate.
I have no idea how the factual evolution of Man took place, and I am not trying to explain it.
My expertise of brains is that of an interested dilettante/hobbyist. I have not, and will not try to connect parts of my model to actual parts of the human or animal brain.
What I did try is understand what an animal or a human brain have to do, and which parts they should be made of, in order to resemble actual brains.
I hope I have shown that it is, at least, plausible to think that:
1) a brain is not some kind of computer,
2) sensations/emotions are a necessary part of intelligence,
3) the information in different parts of a brain can be accessed in two ways:
- directly, in the form of actions,
- virtually, in the form of sensations/emotions/thoughts.
4) the main difference between organisms depends on which information can be accessed virtually.
5) information is understood as present or past stimuli and sensations/emotions.
6) that thoughts about the future can only come from past experience,
7) That the only mysteries we need, besides the existence of matter, is the existence of sensation. We do not need to add to those mysteries one of "thought" as distinct from those two.
8) that the three parts of a brain are not independent from each other, even if they do not have to be all active all the time. The brain can be considered as modular only in a very superficial way. Contrary to what Fodor may think. Modularity of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
9) and, an implicit consequence that has to be fleshed out: brains cannot be parallel computers either.
I will come back to this point later on.
 
This type of bot-generated material belongs... well... not in the BosslandGmbH forums.

Daarno has not repented of his griefing ways, just like his old account. <sigh> We're forced to ban this one too.

Also, thread has been reported several times, so...
Thread closed.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top